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Executive Summary: 
 
US foreign assistance, also known as “foreign aid” or simply “aid,” is a US government 
(USG) system that uses American tax dollars to influence and develop other nations. 
Consequently, aid management carries significant responsibility, and we as a nation must 
ensure it is executed as effectively as possible. The objective of this study is to find an 
effective aid model applicable to the future of US foreign assistance.  
 
This study explores three models for US foreign assistance administration: A) Pre-
MCC—USAID-administered aid until the end of 2003; B) Status Quo—the post 2003 
system, including the MCC and administration under the Director of Foreign Assistance 
(DFA); and C) Restructuring US foreign aid along a MCC model—hypothetically 
channeling more DFA-administered funds through the MCC. The effectiveness of each 
aid model is assessed using five criteria: (1) Alignment, (2) Development Theory, (3) 
Political Control, (4) Accountability, and (5) Results. If a model passes the effectiveness 
criteria within its given time period/framework it is deemed effective. Subsequently, the 
study considers if the most effective model would be feasible in the future.  
 
Analysis of models A and B suggests neither is exceptionally effective within its 
framework, and so both are ineffective models for future foreign aid. This same analysis, 
however, discovers the MCC’s ability to avoid complex procurement processes, quickly 
write and sign Compacts, award aid to demonstrated good performance, maintain 
accountability mechanism(s), and avoid many restrictions of congressional earmarking—
all of which make the MCC, by itself, a fairly effective instrument of aid. There are still 
some elements of the program needing improvement.  
 
The study finds several limitations with Model C, and so discounts the assumption that 
because the MCA/MCC is an effective instrument of foreign assistance simply expanding 
it as is would spread its benefits on a larger scale. MCC restrictions on recipient entities 
and number and duration of contracts limit Model C. It is also uncertain how politically 
acceptable the model will be as many politically attractive aid programs are not 
necessarily transferable to the MCC framework. The model may also jeopardize funding 
for MCC eligible countries currently benefiting in Model B.  
 
Although simply expanding the current MCC/MCA system via Model C is not the most 
effective way to administer aid, some additions to its framework might create a more 
effective aid model applicable to the future. We call this amended model “Model D.” 
Model D would slightly increase funding for the MCC Compact Program and allot 
additional DFA-administered funds to the current Threshold Program and a new program 
called Threshold Gold. A “disaster preparedness” and “inequality” indicator are added to 
current MCC programs. Several other small reforms are proposed. 
 
By following Model D, the study concludes the USG can spend significant portions of 
aid along strategic and ideological lines without substantially increasing the foreign 
assistance budget, and still notably increase the effectiveness of foreign assistance. 
 
Introduction 
 
US foreign assistance, also known as “foreign aid” or simply “aid,” is a US government 
(USG) system that uses American tax dollars to influence and develop other nations.2 
Consequently, aid management carries significant responsibility, and we as a nation must 
ensure it is executed as effectively as possible. The objective of this study is to find an 
effective aid model applicable to the future of US foreign assistance.  
 
Various models of foreign assistance have been proposed over the past century. Reforms 
have tried to address criticisms that US foreign aid is a giveaway program, inefficient, 
lacks accountability, shows few positive results—and according to some— is inherently 
futile. Most reform movements, aside from the 1961 reform creating the Foreign 
Assistance Act, have been failures.  
 
Recently, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC), both created in 2004, have been praised as one of the potentially 
most effective instruments of US foreign aid. As one test of aid effectiveness, this study 
explores whether funds from the budget administered by the Director of Foreign 
Assistance (DFA), which includes development funds within the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and State Department (State), should be 
channeled through the MCC given the MCC’s alleged effectiveness. 
 
This study accepts that much of US foreign assistance, with the possible exception of 
humanitarian aid, has and will continue to have a “strategic” and “ideological” focus: i.e. 
aid will not necessarily be awarded to countries based on comparative need, but instead 
based on objectives of the USG, donors, and the American people. This definition of 
strategic and ideological aid will be used for the remainder of this study. 
 
Methodology 
 
The study collects data via literature review and interviews. Primary data sources are 
EBSCO, MCC website, congressional reports and testimony, internet searches for 
pertinent websites, and interviews with senior USAID/MCC staffers.  
 
The study assesses current problems with the US foreign assistance system using 
information from literature review and interviews, then coupled with individual analysis. 
It then analyzes the MCC/MCA as a system of foreign aid with MCC reforms as of mid 
2007 and predicts what would happen if the system was expanded. No sources were 
found comprehensively answering the research question of this paper, giving indication it 
is a unique study.  
                                                 
2 The United States is the largest international economic aid donor in dollar terms but is the smallest 
contributor among major donor governments when calculated as a percent of GDP. 
 
 
This study explores three models of US foreign assistance administration: A) Pre-MCC— 
USAID-administered aid until the end of 2003; B) Status Quo—the post 2003 aid system, 
including the MCC and administration under the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA); 
and C) Restructuring US foreign aid along a MCC model—hypothetically channeling 
more of DFA-administered funds through the MCC. The effectiveness of each aid model 
is assessed using five criteria: (1) Alignment, (2) Development Theory, (3) Political 
Control, (4) Accountability, and (5) Results. If a model passes the effectiveness criteria 
within its given time period/framework it is deemed effective. Subsequently, the study 
considers the feasibility of structuring the aid system after the most effective model.  
 
Criteria  for Aid 
Effectiveness        
Description 
Alignment/Harmonization Efficient and competitive procurement, financial management, and 
coordination processes—appropriate entities are awarded aid money in a 
timely fashion; monies do not overlap unnecessarily 
Development Theory  
 
(1) macroeconomic stability is often equally important to economic growth 
as is bottom-up development 
*(2) corruption tends to make economies less efficient 
*(3) country ownership: buy-in and country involvement in the 
development process almost always produces the most successful 
development programs.  
(4) institutional strength is a key element in societal and economic health 
(conversely, policies themselves may or may not lead to development 
although their relation to economic growth may be more defined) 
 
Political Control Government has reasonable but not overwhelming control of aid programs  
Accountability   Proper accountability mechanisms are in place 
Results Aid measures up to mission/goals established by the distributing institution 
 
The Models 
 
Our three models most specifically, albeit still broadly, focus on aid administered by 
USAID, USAID/State, and the MCC. They do not specifically discuss aid programs 
administered by other agencies, e.g. DoD, DoA, Treasury, etc. Still, to some degree, the 
models inevitably cover management and policy issues shared by the entire US foreign 
aid system. Each model is only meant to assess very general trends in aid distribution 
within its given framework, and so this analysis does not demand difference-in-
difference(s) testing or delineation of precise percentages of overall foreign aid being 
discussed. For reference, however, the models analyze an average of 55% of the overall 
US foreign aid budget.3  
 
This study makes several assumptions. It assumes a blanket pre-MCC model, although 
broad, has value. For history wonks, separate 1961-1973, 1973-1990, 1990s, 2000s pre- 
                                                 
3 The models analyze anywhere from 30-80% of the US foreign aid budget in any given year, given the 
particular agencies/institutions mentioned. Given Model C’s (and Model D’s) rather inevitable effect on the 
overall Foreign Operations appropriations budget it/they almost certainly encompass more of the overall 
aid budget.  
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MCC, and 2004-2007 models may be more revealing of specific trends in USAID foreign 
assistance, and may be good topic(s) for other studies. The study also assumes that 
simply “increasing the amount of the US foreign aid budget” (e.g. to 0.7% of GDP—sic 
the UN Millennium Project, Jeffery Sach’s The End of Poverty, etc.) is a rather generic 
aid model on which an abundance of research has already been performed, but has thus 
far proven infeasible. Accordingly, Model C (and subsequently Model D), do not rely on 
increasing the overall foreign aid budget, but rather redistribute(s) a larger percentage of 
foreign aid to the MCC. 
 
Importance of Criteria 
 
Alignment/Harmonization:
4  Aid projects are most likely effectively implemented when 
their promoters and designers are still in positions to implement them. Time lags and 
non-competitiveness due to burdensome contracting and procurement procedures make 
aid less effective. Overlapping and poorly coordinated projects and finances also make 
aid less effective.  
 
Development Theory: While there are many important principles of development 
theory, this study will only use four that are most fundamental to effective aid.5 The (2) 
corruption and (3) country ownership principles are emphasized while the other two 
principles of (1) macroeconomic stability and (4) institutional strength are more broadly 
assessed. If a model follows the development theory, which encourages country buy-in 
and overall country stability, it helps support long-term success of its programs and thus 
is effective. 
 
Political Control: Just as over-politicization and “bureaucraticization” of domestic USG 
services hampers the effectiveness of their delivery, overwhelming political control of US 
foreign aid makes it less effective. Some level of political control, however, is mandatory 
in our system of government. Similarly, as far as US aid is a service to foreign citizens 
and not to foreign governments themselves, recipient countries should balance their own 
political control of aid so it is optimal for delivering services to their peoples.  
 
Accountability & Results: These two self-explanatory elements are critical for assessing 
the effectiveness of any aid system. Both elements, however, are inherently challenging 
to measure given difficulty correlating aid’s influence on recipient countries’ policies. In 
particular, results face measurement error, insufficient data, and selection effects like 
political strategy and pressure—all of which may be more consequential than specific 
amounts of aid. Still, this study assumes some aid programs yield better results than 
                                                 
4 These terms are borrowed directly from the 2005 Paris Declaration but are slightly differently and more 
broadly defined. 
5 One particularly important development principle excluded from this study is high levels of inequality 
(e.g. Gini over .45) make poverty reduction more difficult than lower levels of inequality (e.g. Gini lower 
than .45 but not much lower than .25). Development Theory criteria are determined by author. Some of 
theory analysis discusses trends shared by the entire US foreign aid system. 
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others, as some better measure up to missions/goals established by the distributing 
institution.  
 
The Policy Problem in Context 
 
Current structure of US foreign aid 
 
Given the complexity of appropriately measuring and categorizing US foreign aid, this 
section relies on aid categorization by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the 
clearest and most reliable source for such statistics. (The rest of this study also uses these 
CRS figures, but also occasionally references different sources). The most recent CRS 
categorization uses fiscal year (FY) 2004 estimates, calculating the total FY 04 US 
foreign aid budget at $20.673 billion. The CRS distinguishes three major types of foreign  
aid: Bilateral development aid,6 humanitarian aid,7 and multilateral economic 
contributions8 are all termed “development aid,”9 and “military” and 
“economic/political/security” aid comprise the other two categories.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Bilateral development aid is the largest source of US foreign aid, constituting 30% of aid, or $6.2 billion, in FY 2004. 
Bilateral development aid includes aid given to the African Development Foundation, MCC, Inter-American 
Development Foundation, Global AIDS Initiative, Peace Corps, and Trade and Development Agency. 
7 Humanitarian aid is allotted to the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Office of Transition Initiatives 
(OTI), Title II food programs, and private voluntary organizations (PVOs).  
8 Multilateral economic contributions are largely administered by Treasury. UN agencies, notably UNICEF and the 
WFP, are major recipients of this aid. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are also major recipients, as the US 
usually contributes about 20% of all MDB funds.  
 
 
Source: CRS Report for Congress, “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of 
US Programs and Policy” 
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USAID 
 
US foreign aid has traditionally had a strategic and ideological focus. In the aftermath of 
World War II, the US created a variety of aid agencies to reconstruct Europe via the 
Marshall Reconstruction Plan. Unfortunately, these agencies were a rather haphazard 
approach to long-term international development and reconstruction. In an effort to fix a 
broken system, the JFK administration passed the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) in 1961. 
The FAA organized the USG’s different development agencies—notably, the 
International Cooperation Agency (ICA), Development Loan Fund (DLF), Export-Import 
Bank, and Food for Peace Program (at USDA)—under one agency, USAID. Fitting with 
Cold War era mentality, USAID’s mission was to “prevent the social injustice and 
economic chaos upon which subversion and revolt feed”—essentially to stop the spread 
of communism.  
 
Between the 1970s and 1980s, several attempts were made to reform USAID. In 1971, 
the Senate rejected a foreign assistance bill for the first time, amidst growing concern that 
US foreign aid was being used unwisely in Vietnam and that USAID was evolving into a 
giveaway program. Consequentially, several amendments were added to the FAA in 
1973, changing USAID from a money-doling institution to an agency where American 
expertise and consultation were central to aid operations. Throughout the 1980s, 
Congress made several efforts to reform USAID but failed to pass a comprehensive piece 
of reform legislation.   
 
The 1990s were disastrous for USAID. As the Cold War ended, Congress began to 
question the necessity of a foreign aid agency. Foreign spending declined dramatically 
and there was even talk of getting rid of USAID all together. Finally, Congress decided 
USAID would continue operations, but under the condition it dramatically reduce 
capacity and adopt more private sector reforms. These reforms cost USAID 40% of its 
employees, as workers either left and were not replaced, or were laid off during the 1995 
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reduction in force (RIF). The loss of employees and pressure to adopt private sector 
reforms devastated the agency’s human capital and forced a greater reliance on 
contracting. 
 
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the US foreign aid system changed. It began 
focusing more on the war on terror as the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 listed 
aid as the “third pillar” of national security, supporting defense and diplomacy. In 
January 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced a major reengineering 
effort at USAID. Her reform created a new position, Director of Foreign Assistance 
(DFA), a new title for the Administrator of USAID carrying expanded responsibilities.  
 
The 2006 restructure places the DFA under policy supervision from the Secretary of 
State. It also extends DFA oversight beyond development and assistance programs within 
USAID to all related programs at the State Department.10 The new structure is intended 
to better align foreign assistance budgets and programs of State and USAID by 
consolidating and refocusing projects and staff. It is also intended to merge the mission of 
State and USAID, transitioning USAID from merely a development agency to an 
instrument of US foreign policy with a current mission to “create a more secure, 
democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the 
international community.”  
 
 
 
Proposed reform for DFA-administered foreign assistance 
 
Before resigning, former DFA Tobias proposed a Strategic Framework for State and 
USAID budget integration in FY 2008. The framework creates five categories of 
countries: 1) Rebuilding Countries—post-conflict states like Iraq and Haiti; 2) 
Transforming Countries—lower income countries (LICs) and lower-middle income 
countries (LMICs) eligible for the MCC; 3) Sustaining Partnership Countries—higher 
income countries the US has trade, economic, and security relationships with beyond aid; 
4) Reforming Countries—authoritarian governments, a majority of which are ineligible 
                                                 
10 The 2006 aid restructuring aligned budgets and missions of State and USAID but did not really alter 
foreign aid structure in other agencies, e.g. the Department of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Homeland 
Security, Justice, Labor, Treasury, Transportation, Health and Human Services, Interior, etc. 
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for assistance;11 and 5) Developing countries—LICs and LMICs that have not yet met 
MCC criteria. This framework is intended to operate towards five objectives: governing 
justly and democratically, peace and security, economic growth, investing in people, and 
humanitarian assistance.   
 
The MCC and MCA 
 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation differs from the larger State and USAID foreign 
assistance institutions. The MCA was created as the US contribution towards the first 
Millennium Development Goal of reducing global poverty. Although announced by 
President Bush at the 2002 UN Conference on Financing for Development, the 
MCA/MCC was not enacted by Congress until 2004.  
 
The Millennium Challenge Account is administrated by the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation, a government corporation. The MCC is not technically “run” by State and 
USAID, although it receives general oversight from both agencies’ directors. The MCC is 
supervised by the Secretary of State, who serves as Chairman, as well as a Board of 
Directors: the DFA, the Secretary of the Treasury, the US Trade Representative (USTR), 
and four non-governmental directors recommended by House and Senate, nominated by 
the President, and confirmed by the Senate. The CEO of the MCC is nominated by the 
President. The current CEO, John Danilovich, replaced Paul Applegarth who resigned in 
mid-2005.12 
 
The MCC’s mission is to reduce poverty through sustainable economic growth in needy 
developing nations by assuring good governance and accountability. The MCC/MCA is 
the only existing mechanism for awarding aid solely on past performance, whereas other 
aid institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) award aid on 
ex ante conditionality. This makes the MCC/MCA a unique rewards program. On 
average, the MCC receives 7% of the overall foreign assistance budget, between 13-14 % 
of the combined MCC-USAID budget, and roughly 10% of the combined DFA-
administered and MCC budget.13  
  
Countries must first meet income eligibility criteria to qualify for MCC/MCA funds, 
which are delivered through the MCC’s Threshold and Compact programs. Countries 
cannot be subject to any US or international sanctions if to be considered by the MCC.14 
Only LICs, who along with LMICs have income standards determined by the World 
Bank, were eligible for foreign assistance from FY 2004-2005. As of 2006, LMICs could 
qualify for MCC money, however, by law, only 25% of MCC/MCA Compact funds may 
be invested in Compacts for LMICs.  
 
                                                 
11 NGOs are often relied upon to operate in these countries 
12 Applegarth resigned under fire for “not really being the right man for the job.” 
13 Author’s calculations, excluding DFA-administered funds, use CRS figures for FY 2004. DFA-
administered funds calculation uses 2006 figures. 
14 US law prohibits USAID and MCC money from supporting government programs in Burma, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, 
Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe. 
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Countries must go through several steps to qualify for Compacts. After first determining 
income eligibility, the MCC submits its selection criteria/methodology to Congress. This 
includes sixteen indicators, as well as any other criteria that may signal objectiveness to 
“reduce poverty and generate economic growth.” Third, the MCC holds forums on its 
criteria/methodology open to public comment for 30 days. Fourth, the MCC selects 
eligible countries based on indicator scores to the “maximum extent possible.” Countries 
are judged on three categories of indicators, and must score above the median on half of 
the indicators in each of the three categories. Also, it is mandatory that countries score 
above the median on the “control of corruption” indicator.  
 
Income selection criteria 
 
FY GNI/capita income eligibility for 
according FY 
Final MCC Appropriation 
04 LIC: less, or = $1,415 $ 1 bill. 
05 LIC: less, or = $1,435  $1.5 bill. 
06 LIC: less, or = $1,575; LMIC: 
$1,575 - $3,255  
$1.75 bill. 
07 LIC: less, or = $1,673; LMIC: 
greater than $1,673 up to $3,465 
$1.75 bill. 
 
MCC/MCA Indicators 
 
Indicator Sub-indicators Indicator creator 
 
 
Ruling Justly 
Civil Liberties Freedom House 
Political Rights Freedom House 
Voice and Accountability World Bank 
Government Effectiveness World Bank 
Rule of Law World Bank 
Control of Corruption World Bank 
 
 
 
Investing in People 
 
Public Expenditure on Health WHO 
Immunization rate (DPT3 and 
measles) 
WHO 
Girls’ Primary Education 
Completion Rate 
UNESCO 
Public Expenditure on Primary 
Education 
UNESCO and national sources 
 
 
Economic Freedom 
 
 
 
Cost of Starting a Business IFC 
Inflation rate IMF WEO 
Days to start a business IFC 
Trade policy Heritage Foundation 
Regulatory quality World Bank 
Fiscal Policy National sources, IMF 
Supplemental Information 
(Measured as of FY 07. Pending 
approval from the Board of 
Directors may be used as regular 
indicators starting FY 08.) 
 
Natural resources management 
index 
CIESIN/Yale 
Land rights and access index IFAD/IFC 
 
 
Countries are recommended for Compacts after they qualify for assistance. The MCC 
Board of Directors makes the final recommendation on Compact eligibility. Once 
recommended for a Compact, eligible counties are invited to submit a Compact Proposal 
to the MCC. Compacts must be created by the potential recipient country, incorporating 
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insight from civil society groups, the public, private investors, and the government. If 
awarded a Compact, such groups will also oversee Compact implementation and 
establish accountability measures.  
 
The MCC reviews proposals after a 15-day consultation period with Congress, and the 
MCC Board of Directors makes a decision on which countries receive Compacts. 
Compacts are then polished by the MCC and recipient countries and presented to the 
Board for final approval. Upon Board approval, Compacts are ready for signing. 
Compacts are presumably awarded according to requested proposal amount and scope of 
Compact. Compacts are limited to no more than five years.  
 
Compact countries are assessed every year on income eligibility and indicator scores, and 
additional countries are usually added to the eligibility pool. In FY 2004, 16 countries 
were eligible for Compact funds; 17 in FY 2005 (16 from FY 04 + 1); 20 in FY 2006 (17 
from FY 05 + 3); and 26 in FY 2007 (20 from FY 06 + 6). There are currently 11 
countries with MCA Compacts. 
 
The Threshold Program, another part of the MCC, is intended to help countries who show 
great improvement on many MCC indicators but have persistent problems on one or 
more indicators. As of FY 05, "threshold countries are countries that do not qualify for 
Millennium Challenge Account assistance but have demonstrated a commitment to 
meeting the eligibility requirements for MCA assistance in the future." Given similar 
parameters currently, the Threshold Program eligibility process is a bit more ambiguous 
than the Compact process.  
 
Threshold agreements and Compacts share some basic structures. Both must meet the 
same income eligibility criteria. Like Compacts, Threshold contracts are presumably 
funded according to their size and scope. Also, there are currently 21 countries eligible 
for the Threshold program, 13 of which are currently receiving Threshold program 
contracts; these contract and eligibility ratios are similar to those of the Compact 
program. 
 
After being selected as Threshold eligible, a country must submit a Threshold Country 
Plan. There are two phases of these plans, Section I and Section II. Section I requires a 
brief analysis of the MCC policy indicators in which the country fell short, what has been 
done to address these areas, and a commitment to reform. Section II requires a 
significantly more detailed plan. Both plans are reviewed by the MCC’s Investment 
Committee and its Board of Directors. Once the Board approves the plans, Congress is 
given a 15-day notification period after which contracts can be signed. 
 
Threshold programs face several other stipulations. Unlike Compact agreements, 
Threshold Country Plans are implemented by USG agencies (e.g. most often USAID, 
DoJ, etc.). After being enrolled in the Threshold Program some countries may be eligible 
for Compacts. By law, the MCC can award no more than 10% of MCC funds to 
Threshold agreements.  
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Compacts as of 5/2007 
 
Country Date signed Amount (millions) Goal/Description 
Madagascar 4/18/2005 $110 Help move to market-driven economy, 
develop agriculture and rural business 
Honduras 6/13/2005 $215 Address low agricultural productivity and 
high transportation costs 
Cape Verde 7/4/2005 $110 Increase agricultural productivity, integrate 
internal markets, reduce transportation 
costs, develop private sector 
Nicaragua 7/14/2005 $175 Reduce transportation costs, improve access 
to markets, improve property rights, 
increase investment, raise incomes of farms 
and rural businesses 
Georgia 9/12/2005 $295.3 Improve infrastructure, improve 
development of regional enterprises 
Benin 2/22/2006 $307.3 Increase access to land and expand credit 
systems, bring courts closer to local 
populations 
Vanuatu 3/2/2006 $65.69 Improve infrastructure 
Armenia 3/27/2006 $235.65 Increase economic performance in the 
agricultural sector—reduce transportation 
costs, higher yield crops, etc. 
Ghana 8/1/2006 $547.009 Increase production and productivity if 
high-value cash and food crops, enhance 
competitiveness of agricultural exports 
Mali 11/13/2006 $406.8 Investment in infrastructure—namely the 
Bamako-Senou International Airport and 
Niger River irrigation system 
El Salvador 11/29/2006 $461 Transportation projects, rural business 
development, investments in public services 
Other eligible countries: Albania*, Burkina Faso*, Bolivia, East Timor (*), Jordan*, Lesotho, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Ukraine*, and Tanzania*. Eligible countries that currently have 
not entered Compacts ostensibly are awaiting funding or still have yet to submit a finalized/agreeable proposal to the 
MCC. * denotes country is already receiving Threshold funds. (*) denotes country is not receiving funds but is eligible 
for both the Compact and Threshold program. 
 
 
Threshold Programs as of 5/2007 
 
Country Date signed Amount 
(millions) 
Goal/description 
Burkina Faso 7/22/05 $12.9 Improve girls primary education completion rates 
Malawi 9/23/05 $21 Reduce corruption and improve fiscal management 
Albania  4/3/2006 $13.85 Reduce corruption 
Tanzania 5/3/2006 $11 Reduce corruption 
Paraguay 5/8/06 $34.65 Fight corruption and improve business climate 
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Zambia 5/22/06 $22.7 Reduce corruption and improve government effectiveness 
Philippines 7/26/06 $21 Fight corruption and improve revenue collection 
Jordan 10/17/06 $25 Strengthen democratic institutions  
Indonesia 11/17/06 $55 Improve childhood immunization and curb corruption 
Ukraine 10/4/06 $45 Fight corruption 
Moldova 12/15/06 $24.7 Support anti-corruption initiatives 
Kenya 3/23/07 $12.70 Reduce corruption 
Uganda 3/29/07 $10.40 Reduce corruption 
Other eligible countries: Yemen (reinstated in 2007), East Timor, Guyana, Kyrgyz Republic, Niger, Peru, Rwanda, and 
Sao Tome and Principe. Eligible countries that currently have not entered Threshold Program Plans ostensibly are 
awaiting funding or still have yet to submit a finalized/agreeable proposal to the MCC. 
 
 
Analysis, Including Options 
 
MODEL A: USAID PRE-MCC 
 
Some might argue the pre-MCC model of US foreign assistance is the most effective aid 
system. Using Model A, which measures aid effectiveness at USAID pre-MCC, we 
assess this argument. Although different time periods within Model A might present 
issues of slightly different substance, the model still shows the broad ineffectiveness of 
the USAID system pre-MCC. The model does not meet the aid effectiveness criteria 
given its overlapping programs, uncompetitive sourcing, incongruence with development 
theory, congressional earmarking, lack of accountability, and mixed results in meeting 
program goals. 
 
Alignment/Harmonization 
 
The pre-MCC USAID aid distribution system does not have an adequately efficient or 
effective procurement or financial management & coordination process. Specifically, 
Model A’s alignment/harmonization of aid is ineffective because of overlapping of 
projects, lack of competitive sourcing, and restrictive laws.  
 
USAID and State programs have traditionally overlapped. One reason for such poor 
coordination is the classic trend that US agencies, e.g. USAID, State, DoD, DoA, etc. all 
like to maintain high-profile and publicly-attractive programs, regardless if another 
agency has a similar program or is better suited to implement such a program. A 
complicated system of overlapping projects and project goals makes the pre-MCC model 
very ineffective at aligning and harmonizing aid.  
 
The President’s Management Agenda (PMA) scorecard, a management assessment first 
developed in 2001 to grade executive agencies, has consistently issued [US]AID a “red” 
score for competitive sourcing, indicating “unsatisfactory” performance. Additionally, 
during the pre-MCC years, 2001-December 2003, USAID showed no sign of 
“successful” improvement (a “green” score) in competitive sourcing. Although the 
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scorecard only measures a small snapshot of USAID’s pre-MCC history it is 
representative of an alignment/harmonization problem that has long plagued USAID. The 
magnitude of this uncompetitive sourcing problem became most pronounced after the 
dramatic USAID workforce reductions of the 1990s, and subsequently a handful of D.C.-
based contractors engrained themselves in USAID contracting culture. 
 
A lack of competitiveness in sourcing makes Model A’s alignment/harmonization of aid 
ineffective by unwisely denying contracts to qualified American and foreign firms. 
Program oversight and implementation usually costs less for foreign firms in countries of 
aid operations than for outside contractors, who must hire Foreign Service nationals 
(FSNs) and other personnel.15 Model A also deprives qualified foreign firms of revenue, 
simultaneously depriving the economy in the country of operation.  
 
Laws are a significant contributor to the pre-MCC aid system’s poor score on the 
alignment/harmonization criterion. The FAA extends guidelines of the Buy-American 
Act (1933) to USAID programs. The Buy-American Act, standard across government, 
requires agencies purchase most of their goods/products within the US. This creates 
“tied” aid. USAID usually must use American goods for foods or services, although it 
can buy many products from Africa when in Africa. Some exceptions are made on a case-
by-case basis. Federal Acquisition regulations laws allow the USAID Administrator to 
waive normal contracting procedures via written determination that “compliance with full 
and open competition procedures would impair foreign assistance objectives and would 
be inconsistent with the fulfillment of foreign assistance programs.” 16  The effect of this 
loophole on alignment/harmonization is dubious. 
 
In fairness, some units in the pre-MCC system have more efficient and effective 
alignment procedures than the larger system, largely because of the specificity of their 
mission. One such unit is the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), created in 1994 as a 
fast and flexible unit for providing short-term aid supporting democratic change; OTI’s 
use of the Support Which Implements Fast Transition (SWIFT) mechanism speeds 
contracting. Although OTI and several other units have special contracting mechanisms, 
they are not representative of the overall inefficient alignment practices within the larger 
pre-MCC USAID model.17 
 
On average, it takes between 18-24 months to graduate from proposal to contract under 
most multilateral and bilateral aid programs.18 This slow process contributes to Model 
A’s poor score on the alignment/harmonization criteria. The majority of Model A’s 
projects usually require extensive documentation of expected outcomes, cultural impact, 
effect on women or vulnerable groups, risk, etc.—even projects for disasters and 
emergency require a standard pre-assessment.  
                                                 
15 Assuming there are capable and established firms already in countries of operation, which is not always 
the case 
16 Recall Model A is pre-MCC, and the “Administrator” title was not changed  to “DFA” until 2006 
17 Other units include the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) 
18 Fox, James and Lex Rieffel. The Millennium Challenge Account: Moving Toward Smarter Aid.” The 
Brookings Institution, Washington D.C: July 2005. 1-38. 
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Development Theory 
 
The pre-MCC model earns mixed results on three of the four development theory 
principles and outright violates one. Accordingly, the model does not clearly meet the 
development theory criteria. 
 
The pre-MCC model outright ignores the second (2) development theory criterion that 
corruption tends to make economies less efficient. In fact, 2002 study by Alesina and 
Weder entitled Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid? finds a positive 
correlation between corruption and US aid. In other words, the majority of US foreign aid 
as of 2002 (pre-MCC) went to less than efficient economies and governments.19  
 
Model A presents mixed results on development criterion (1) macroeconomic stability 
and (4) institutional strength. A seminal 2000 study by Burnside and Dollar finds a weak 
association between international aid flows and policy. This in part reflects the pre-MCC 
model’s weak adherence to the macroeconomic stability criterion. As for criterion (4), 
there is little evidence aid within Model A is awarded to countries with the most viable 
and effective institutions, although there is a trend of awarding non-communist 
institutions.  
 
Perhaps one of the biggest weaknesses of the pre-MCC aid system is its mixed results on 
the third development theory criterion (3), country ownership. Pre-MCC programs are 
usually run from the top-down, where ambassadors and government officials determine 
types and monetary values of aid projects. In this sense, there is some vested interest in 
the success of aid projects but it is by no means widespread across the larger population 
of the recipient country, or even within the US for that matter. Without country 
ownership there is often not enough incentive or vested interest for a recipient country to 
fully commit to optimizing aid. 
 
The pre-MCC system faces significant cultural barriers in aid implementation because it 
does not encourage enough country ownership. Take the anecdotal example that several 
years ago, USAID staff working on a tight schedule arrived in a Middle Eastern country 
to install financial software systems and implement a few other projects—the group did 
not realize it was Ramadan and they could not work during the holiday. In similar 
situations, USAID has discovered labor mobility inhibited by culture, e.g. women 
involved in aid projects can not relocate, even temporarily, without taking their families 
with them. Such examples are representative of the larger and well-documented 
phenomenon of cultural unawareness US aid institutions face when entering a foreign 
region or country, especially those with non-Western cultures.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 This trend is inclusive of the entire pre-MCC US foreign aid system, not exclusively USAID.  
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Political Control 
 
Congressional earmarks make the pre-MCC system model ineffective. Congress 
earmarks USG funding for most foreign assistance, only allowing spending in designated 
sectors. Congressional earmarks are usually very limited compared with the magnitude of 
congressionally-mandated and USAID-administered program demands.  
 
Andrew Natsios, USAID Administrator during the pre-MCC era, identified congressional 
earmarking of aid as a “greater problem than USAID’s deficiencies in program and 
mission coordination.” Since the late 1960s and 1970s, Congress has been worried about 
giving USAID too much discretion over its own budget, one reason being USAID has 
had trouble showing transparency in its budgeting practices, another being it has shown 
inconsistent project results. Political control in Model A herein is a circular problem. 
 
Accountability  
 
Internal obstacles in Model A complicate accountability between USAID and Congress, 
and between USAID and its aid recipients. Model A lacks an appropriate reporting 
framework for measuring progress, although in fairness, establishing such a system is 
difficult given the inherent lag in performance results associated with long-term aid 
projects.  
 
The pre-MCC system does have some mechanisms for standardizing its financial and 
management accountabilities, but still adheres to an inappropriate combination of weak 
bottom-up accountability and over-burdening top-down accountability. This is a 
traditional problem in Model A: top management feels pressure from Congress and the 
Executive, and in response implements often inappropriate outcome/performance 
standards throughout the agency which are applicable all the way to ground operations. 
This approach largely ignores ground-level operation autonomy and imposes indicators 
that are not well-tailored to particular ground situations and environments.  
 
Results 
 
Actual results are the most ambiguous issue in the effectiveness of aid debate. Without 
delving into an exhaustive analysis—which would inevitably become quite subjective—
we can recognize there have been some positive (at least marginally), negative, and rather 
non-consequential results of aid in Model A. Still, even lines between these results are 
often subjective. 
 
Model A’s track record for meeting aid agency goals is mixed. For one, US aid’s record 
for helping countries develop and alleviate destruction wrought by natural disasters and 
complex emergencies is mixed. Some have argued Model A yields results in-line with its 
top mission to prevent the spread of communism. Still, the extent to which US aid 
directly contributed to this result rather than the failing of communism for a variety of 
other reasons, and the extent to which aid efficiently supported this result, is dubious in 
many instances. 
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After September 11th, but still pre-MCC, the aid system was revamped to help combat 
global terrorism. It may be too early for a comprehensive analysis on aid’s contribution to 
this recent endeavor.  One may conclude, measuring the results of aid given to South 
Asian states like Pakistan, and Middle Eastern states like Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and Saudi 
Arabia, that aid has had a positive effect on reducing terrorism.20 Still, this trend is 
debatable, and recently is even starting to look more negligible than positive. 
 
MODEL B: STATUS QUO, DFA-ADMINISTERED AND MCC AID 
 
Model B suffers from many of the pre-MCC failures discussed in Model A. Given Model 
A’s discussion of the broad USAID aid system, this analysis will primarily highlight the 
MCC. According to our analysis, the MCC’s ability to avoid complex procurement 
processes, quickly write and sign Compacts, award aid to demonstrated good 
performance and largely avoid restrictions in the congressional earmarking process make 
it more effective than the pre-MCC model/Model A. Despite these effective 
characteristics, however, the status-quo model is still largely ineffective because the 
MCC only compromises around 7% of overall foreign aid, and roughly 10% of combined 
DFA-administered and MCC aid. 
 
Alignment/Harmonization 
 
Given inherent lags in nearly all development programs, institutions like the MCC that 
reduce bureaucratic processing are optimal for alignment/harmonization of aid. The MCC 
also wisely extends eligibility to a majority of the poorest LICs, although there is concern 
about what percentage of LMICs are receiving funds. Despite positive performance on 
the alignment/harmonization criterion, however, the MCC/MCA is only a limited part of 
the status quo foreign assistance system, and so its successes alone cannot justify leaving 
the current aid system at status quo.   
 
Procurement for MCC programs is much faster/more efficient than most all bilateral and 
multilateral aid programs. This allows the MCC to operate fairly smoothly and largely 
avoid the issues of uncompetitive sourcing in Model A. In particular, the MCC is not 
required to follow the same tied aid rules of Model A. 
 
The process of project enactment is much faster for the MCA than for other aid programs.  
On average, MCA programs usually take around 6 months for contracts to graduate from 
proposal to implementation. In contrast, recall most bilateral and multilateral aid projects 
usually take 18-24 months.  
 
The timeliness of MCA programs is partially due to laxer procurement rules. Also, 
Compacts are arranged quicker because unlike other aid plans they do not require 
extensive documentation of expected outcomes, cultural impact, effect on women or 
vulnerable groups, risk, etc. This is not necessarily a dangerous trade-off because MCC 
                                                 
20 “Results” might include number of international terrorist attacks on the US thwarted, number of 
international terrorists killed, etc. 
 18
countries are required to develop their own solid strategies for contracts, as discussed in 
the next section. 
 
There should be natural concerns about alignment/harmonization of MCC aid. Although 
the MCC funds countries that score well on indicator scores, what about countries that 
have little hope of meeting indicator goals in the near term? After all, it might seem that 
the best performing countries—those that essentially have ‘well’ organized and properly 
running governments and economies—may not be the poorest and/or are least in need of 
outside assistance.  
 
The above idea has some merit, but the MCC awards the majority of its Compact funds 
(75%) to LICs as required by law.  In fact, among all eligible LICs, the MCC has 
contracts or extends eligibility to 53% of the countries in the bottom income quartile, 
60% of those in the second lowest quartile, 60% in the third quartile, and 53% in the 
highest quartile.21 Accordingly, the MCC is inclusive of a respectable amount of even the 
poorest LICs. 
 
Although a majority of the poorest LICs are eligible for the MCC funding, LMICs make 
up a significant percentage of countries actually receiving funding.22 This is potentially 
detrimental to aid alignment/harmonization focusing on the MCC’s core mission. LMICs 
make up 36% of countries currently funded by Compact agreements and 23% of 
countries with funded Threshold plans. Overall, LMICs make up 29% of countries with 
both Compacts and Threshold agreements. Although LMICS are not receiving over 25% 
of MCC Compact funding, which would violate MCC regulations, if they continue to 
make up a significant portion of funded MCC/MCA programs while LICs stay ‘in the 
pipeline’ waiting to receive funding this may be cause for concern (see Appendix-Figure 
C).  
 
Development Theory 
 
The MCC meets the development theory criteria, although its performance on criteria (3) 
and (4) is a somewhat debatable. Additionally, evidence suggests it would be very 
difficult for countries to “game” the MCC system—fudging indicator scores—as some 
indictors are too opaque to manipulate, and outside experts use indicator rating schemes 
to which countries are not fully privy. Unfortunately, the MCA/MCC is only a limited 
part of the status quo foreign assistance system, and so its successes in development 
theory alone cannot justify leaving the current aid system at status quo.   
 
                                                 
21 Estimates by author for all MCA programs using MCC countries eligible as of FY 2007 and the most 
recent WB categorization available (used in 2007), which uses GNI/capita from 2005. Somalia, Cuba, and 
Myanmar excluded because not specifically ranked in the WB categorization. MCC 2005 LIC income cut-
off of $1,435 was used, but Angola (the highest income LIC country) was excluded to make quartile sums 
round numbers. Syria, Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Central African Republic, Zimbabwe, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, and Burundi were also excluded because of laws prohibiting their receipt of direct US 
foreign assistance.  
22 Estimates by author using MCC countries eligible as of FY 2007 and the most recent WB categorization 
available (used in 2007), which uses GNI/capita from 2005. Somalia, Cuba, and Myanmar excluded 
because not specifically ranked in the WB categorization. MCC 2005 LIC income cut-off of $1,435 used. 
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Awarding good scores on MCC indicators is a fairly substantive way to meet 
development principle (1), and arguably principle (4). Using indicators on “Economic 
Freedom” to rank countries helps ensure macroeconomic stability, at very least because 
these indicators are currently the best measures for macro policy available. Due to the 
comprehensiveness of all MCC indicators, one could assume eligible MCC countries 
need fairly well-established institutions—or at least institutions comparatively better than 
those with significantly worse indicator scores—to appropriately meet the eligibility level 
required of them. This assumption, however, may be debatable and in fact incorrect, 
presenting a number of issues for the MCA/MCC, as well as development studies at 
large, which are discussed in the Appendix-Figure A.23  
 
The MCC/MCA attempts to create a public opinion mechanism not as visible in the 
larger current foreign assistance system, bringing the MCC at least partially in-line with 
the (3) country ownership principle. Some suggest MCC countries are able to meet the 
country ownership principle because many are required to submit Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) to the World Bank and IMF.24 Although PRSPs may provide an 
unprecedented mechanism for some level of “country ownership” in aid programs, the 
degree of their effectiveness as a “democratic” participation mechanism is disputed.  
 
PRSP weaknesses may foreshadow potential weaknesses in many MCC country-
ownership practices. Further, given the economic slant of the MCC’s policy indicators, it 
would not be surprising if private sector investors and consultants within a country 
overwhelmingly dominate, and perhaps manipulate, the MCA Compact and Threshold 
proposal process. Fully evaluating this issue is a good topic for another study.  
 
 
MCC Compact and Threshold Countries & PRSPs 
 
LICs w/PRSPS LICs w/out PRSPs LMICs w/ 
PRSPs 
LMICs 
w/out 
PRSPs 
Madagascar 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Georgia 
Benin 
Ghana 
Mali 
Bolivia 
East Timor 
Burkina Faso 
Lesotho 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Mozambique 
Senegal 
Sri Lanka 
Tanzania 
Malawi* 
Zambia* 
Kenya* 
Uganda* 
Guyana* 
Kyrgyz 
Republic* 
Niger* 
Rwanda* 
Sao Tome 
and 
Principe* 
 
Paraguay* 
Philippines* 
Jordan 
Indonesia* 
 
Armenia 
Vanuatu 
Albania 
Cape Verde 
 
El Salvador 
Morocco 
Namibia 
Ukraine 
Jordan 
Peru* 
* denotes exclusively Threshold countries. FY 05 income standards used. PRSP status as of 2007. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Note: referring to the Appendix – Figure B, institutional strength (with a positive coefficient) held a 
statistically significant relationship with the amount of money awarded to Threshold Programs. 
24 PRSPs are annual progress reports discussing a country’s macro, social, and structural polices for growth, 
poverty reduction, and economic stability. They are updated every three years, and serve as the basis for 
Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) participation and International Development Association (IDA) 
assistance.  
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Political Control 
 
The MCC generally avoids the restrictive congressional earmarking of the pre-MCC 
system. Still, as a government corporation, the MCC is not immune to all political 
pressure.25 Further, the MCC is only a limited part of the status quo model and so the 
larger model still faces the same restrictive political control of the pre-MCC model.  
 
Congress flatly approves the MCC’s gross budget. The MCC is given discretion on how 
to spend this money, avoiding much of the “politics of aid” traditionally burdening 
USAID in Model A. It is important to note, however, that one reason Congress has yet to 
approve the full request for MCA funds in any fiscal year is at least partly because the 
budget is limited by Iraq, Afghanistan, and other war on terror expenditures.  
 
Some may assume the MCC is simply an extension of the most recent US foreign policy 
drive to heavily award democracies since it awards good governance as defined by 
institutions often associated with Western ideologies. MCC funds, however, are not 
necessarily only awarded to established democracies. Uganda, an autocracy, currently 
receives Threshold Program funds to reduce corruption. Jordan, which is not a 
democracy, receives Threshold funds, albeit funds to build democratic institutions. 
Rwanda and Morocco are also eligible for MCC money, yet neither are democracies. 
 
Although there is strong evidence indicating countries are awarded contracts because of 
their superlative scores on MCC indicators, there is some question about exactly which 
countries are ultimately selected for eligibility—as sometimes otherwise “eligible” 
countries are not invited by the MCC Board of Directors to apply to the program. This 
may suggest some political finagling within the program. For example, Bulgaria, Brazil, 
and Samoa scored among eligible countries during FY 2007 but were not invited into the 
Compact program. Still, most evidence suggests the Compact program is far less political 
than other US aid programs. 
 
The MCC’s Threshold Program faces slightly different political involvement than the 
Compact program, which may ultimately affect its politicization. Recall that after the 
MCC Board of Directors approves Threshold plans Congress is given a 15-day 
notification period after which the agreement can be signed. Compacts, however, require 
a 15-day consultation period with Congress before the Board makes the final decision on 
funding; Compacts are exclusively presented to the Board for approval before being 
signed. Although it is unclear how exactly the approval process affects the Threshold 
program, it may potentially politicize it more than the Compact program.  
 
                                                 
25 Additionally, the MCC shares several restrictions on program expenditures and processes with other US 
foreign aid programs that may or may not be appropriately termed “political.” US law prohibits USAID and 
MCC money from supporting government programs in Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African 
Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe. 
Also, the MCC and USAID must notify Congress at least fourteen days prior to any proposed project 
commitments. Additionally, no aid programs can use USG funds for abortions and sterilizations.  
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There is also ambiguity surrounding Threshold country eligibility. There is evidence that 
Secretary Rice wanted Jordan to be a Threshold country and so pushed it in front of other 
candidate countries with similar indicator scores. The Kyrgyz Republic, which failed all 
of the “Ruling Justly” indicators in 2006, was still invited into the Threshold Program. 
Indonesia, invited into the Threshold Program in 2006, has consistently fallen 
substantially short on many policy indicators.  
 
Although uncertainty surrounds Compact and Threshold country selection, which may 
very well involve some political motivations, allotment of funds to eligible countries is 
likely independent of overt political motivations. Funding is also likely independent of 
relative income.26 A regression model for Threshold Program contracts suggests that 
GNI/capita, population, as well as a variety of ‘political’ variables—e.g. percentage of 
Muslims in the country, status as a terrorist haven, number of visits by the Secretary of 
State, percent of exports to the US, etc.—were not statistically significant determinants of 
the amount of money awarded to Threshold countries (See Appendix - Figure B). This 
may suggest Threshold Program monies are awarded more by proposal merit than by 
political considerations. Also, since Compact program selection is potentially less 
political than Threshold program selection, one might speculate that awarding of funds 
for the former is no more political than for the latter.  
 
Accountability 
 
The MCA has several good accountability measures, including its mechanism for 
awarding funding, bottom-up accountability standards, and willingness to punish 
countries that do not maintain good indicator scores. Still, there are some ambiguities 
surrounding MCA accountability mechanisms. Also, although USAID has made some 
reforms during the MCC years, notably adding the Performance and Accountability 
Report (PAR) it jointly files with State, some say these changes reflect the same largely 
misguided approach towards accountability present in the pre-MCC model. Further, the 
MCC only makes up a limited amount of the status quo system, and so despite its 
contribution to improved accountability practices, its impact on Model B’s effectiveness 
is limited. 
 
The MCC has the unique mechanism of awarding funding after progress has been made 
rather than ex ante. This seems to be one of the most promising mechanisms for aid 
accountability. Also, given adherence to the country ownership principle, MCA countries 
in Model B have a greater flexibility in creating bottom-up accountability measures in 
coordination with the MCC, avoiding the top-down approach that perverted Model A’s 
accountability. 
 
The MCC has demonstrated willingness to punish Threshold countries who do not 
maintain appropriate scores on policy indicators. This sort of solid accountability is 
largely unfathomable at USAID, after all “what might the ambassador say?” In June 
2006, The Gambia was suspended from Compact eligibility due to actions inconsistent 
                                                 
26 This trend is not necessarily worrisome as it does not measure purchasing power parity (PPP)-adjusted 
income. Even if it used PPP adjusted income the trend is not necessarily negative. 
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with selection criteria. Within the last year, a stop-order was placed on the MCC contract 
with Paraguay until it successfully filed a “remediation plan” to tackle worsening 
corruption.  In 2005, Yemen was dropped from the Threshold Program, and only after 
arguably ‘learning its lesson’ via improvement in several MCC indicators was it 
reinstated in 2007.27  
 
Although it demonstrates willingness to punish Threshold countries, the MCC faces 
challenges from Compact countries backsliding on their indicator scores. It is inferably 
easier to suspend and terminate agreements under the Threshold Program than under the 
Compact Program. Recall that the Threshold Program relies on USG contracts, whereas 
Compacts are instead contracts between the MCC and the recipient’s country’s national 
government. This may complicate the MCC’s accountability measures, as illustrated by 
Armenia, a Compact country that has notably regressed in the area of democratic 
governance but has not yet had its Compact status effectively jeopardized, suspended, or 
terminated. 
 
Results 
 
Although the MCC mechanism is likely the best available US aid system for encouraging 
economic growth, it has not yet yielded solid results in either increasing economic growth 
or reducing poverty. Additionally, and as mentioned, the MCA/MCC is only a very 
limited part of the status quo foreign assistance system, so its potential successes cannot 
justify leaving the current aid system at status quo.   
 
Basing awards on indicators is not a new US aid method to award a country's economic 
performance. As implemented by the MCC, however, it may be one of the more effective 
methods—creating what has become known as the “MCC effect.”28 According to a 2006 
Harvard University study using difference-in-difference modeling, potential recipients of 
MCC monies improved 25% more on indicators after the MCC was created than before 
its creation. 29 
 
While the MCC has set up a system that rewards the ‘most capable’ national 
governments, there is no strong quantitative evidence suggesting it has created economic 
growth, which is its central mission. There is also no strong quantitative evidence that it 
has contributed to poverty reduction. Lack of results may be due to time lags, especially 
since the MCC/MCA is less than four years old. The effectiveness of MCC/MCA in 
creating economic growth will undoubtedly be closely monitored in the near future. 
 
 
                                                 
27 Still, Yemen fails 13 of the 16 indicators 
28 Several phenomena are similar to the MCC effect, albeit not from “aid” programs per say: A) The WTO 
requires countries to meet a variety of policy indicators before gaining membership. According to seminal 
analysis by Tang and Wei (2006), the process of reforming to qualify for the WTO afforded countries their 
highest growth rates, although they experienced only modest increases in growth subsequent to induction 
into the organization. MCA countries may or may not fully follow this pattern. B) Countries must show a 
certain level of competency on 35 policy indicators before joining the EU. 
29 Johnson, Doug and Tristan Zajonc. Can Foreign Aid Create an Incentive for Good Governance? 
Evidence from the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Harvard University, 2006. 
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MODEL C: CHANNELING MORE AID THROUGH THE MCC/MCA 
 
Model C simply requires the MCC receive a larger proportion of the foreign aid budget, 
without changing the structure of the existing MCC system. The model would not require 
an increase in overall foreign aid because the MCC/MCA system is already in place. Any 
cost would simply be hiring new MCC staff to take on the increased workload and 
manage the increased funds—and this overhead would be largely offset since MCC staff 
could replace USAID staff and USAID employees could transfer to the MCC. To truly 
make Model C analysis-worthy it will increase the MCC’s percentage of the overall US 
foreign assistance budget by 200%. This would require channeling 20% of DFA-
administered funds into the MCC.  
 
Since the MCC/MCA itself is an effective aid distributing institution, it might seem 
rational to assume expanding it on a larger level would only more widely spread its 
benefits. This, however, is an invalid assumption. Although the MCC works for itself as 
currently structured, there are potential problems when simply expanding it as a larger 
foreign aid model. 
 
Alignment/Harmonization 
 
When expanded, the MCC system faces several alignment/harmonization challenges not 
necessarily shared by the current MCC system. Model C’s restrictions on duration and 
number of Compacts are problematic. The model also potentially diverts funds from the 
development assistance (DA) account and may jeopardize sector-specific aid programs.  
 
The MCC faces restrictions on the duration and number of Compacts it can operate at a 
given time, and so may not be an optimal model for larger foreign assistance reform, 
although these restrictions seem to make sense for the current MCC system. MCC 
Compacts are limited to five years like most World Bank projects. This limit may make 
sense for the sake of predictable results, but may unnecessarily limit development in 
some countries that would be better suited with more time to implement projects. Also, 
MCC rules prohibit it from entering multiple Compacts with any individual country. 
These restrictions should not apply to a larger foreign assistance system model because 
they pose tight limits on development plans. 
 
A study by the Center for Global Development finds recent US aid has been reduced to 
all countries, excluding outlier countries of Iraq, Afghanistan, Jordan, and Pakistan.30 Of 
these cuts, cuts to MCA countries are largely from the USAID-appropriated development 
assistance (DA) account. It is unclear why funds are reduced in the DA account, but this 
is an alarming pattern. Model C does little to protect its funds in this environment. 
 
Simply expanding the MCC threatens effective alignment/harmonization of aid because it 
might divert funds from programs US agencies might otherwise fund. Recall the MCC 
does not require countries to spend money in specific sectors, but rather lets them decide 
                                                 
30
 Brown, Kaysie, and Bilal Siddiqi, and Myra Sessions. US Development Aid and the Millennium 
Challenge Account: Emerging Trends in Appropriations. Center for Global Development.  Oct. 2006.   
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what projects they would like the MCC to fund. This mechanism may end up creating a 
development gap. Although Model C expands the allocation of MCC money it does not 
stipulate that eligible countries must keep their funding from other DA programs. For 
example, if Benin receives MCC funds to build its agricultural sector, USAID 
development assistance that would otherwise go to developing its educational sector 
might now be awarded to a different country that does not receive MCC funds. 
 
Development Theory 
 
Expanding the MCC’s percentage of the foreign aid budget will probably magnify the 
effectiveness of  Model B in terms of development principles (1), (2), and (4). However, 
although analysis suggests the MCC at least partially meets the development criterion (3) 
country ownership (see Model B), it may also unnecessarily define and limit country 
ownership since it requires Compacts to be signed exclusively with national 
governments. This stipulation seems acceptable for the current MCC system but limits 
the applicability of the model on a larger scale. In fact, Judith Tenler in her book Good 
Government in the Tropics suggests that many development programs, including 
corruption-busting, are best implemented by state government, via Industrial 
Performance and Workforce Transformation (IPWT), one model for country-ownership.  
 
Political Control 
 
Driving more aid through a MCC-style mechanism may partially alleviate the 
inefficiencies the current system faces in congressional earmarking. The expansion, 
however, will inevitably affect non-emergency spending aid doled out each year in the 
Foreign Operations budget, which determines the majority of funds for USG aid 
programs. Herein, the degree to which Model C forces politicians to prioritize what 
programs they must cut or adjust in order to award the MCC a larger percentage of 
foreign aid will determine the political feasibility of Model C.  
 
Politicians may fight Model C to the extent that it forces cuts in politically attractive 
programs that do not fit under the MCC’s framework, i.e. aid to countries that do not 
qualify under the MCC’s selection methods. There are countries in humanitarian, 
economic/political/security, and particularly high-profile programs like the President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) that might be denied aid under Model C. 
This puts politicians in a difficult position. 
 
Model C might force Congress to reduce military aid to three of the five top recipients of 
US military aid (see Appendix - Figure D). This would cause great political concern. 
Current MCC income eligibility requirements are too low to be applicable Israel, the 
consistent number one recipient of US military foreign assistance. Additionally, two 
other of the top recipients of US military aid, Colombia and Pakistan, do not meet the 
MCC eligibility criteria, failing to score above the median on at least half of the 
indicators per the three major policy areas.  
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Accountability 
 
Model C would inferably experience roughly the same types of accountability strengths 
and weaknesses of Model B.  
 
Results 
 
We can only forecast the results of Model C. Given the analysis of the other criteria in the 
model we assume results would be as mixed or maybe slightly better than in Model B. 
 
Recommendations – Creating Model D 
  
The US aid system should be reformed along Model D to develop the positive and avoid 
the negative qualities of models A, B, and C. Model D should be well-funded. It will look 
closest to Model C in that it allots an increased percentage of the US foreign aid budget 
to the MCC. Model D also adds two new indicators to the current sixteen and makes 
some minor changes to current MCC Compact and Threshold structure and regulations. 
 
Model D allots 20-25% of DFA-administered funds to the MCC/MCA. The model only 
modestly increases funding for the Compact program using 7-8% of these DFA-
administered funds, a sum almost in-line with the President’s recent yearly budget 
requests for the MCC/MCA as a whole. The additional 15-17% of funding is for the 
Threshold Program and a new program called Threshold Gold, a proposal that will 
require a change in current law limiting the Threshold program to 10% of MCC funds.  
 
MCC, USAID, and State staff should decide how the two Threshold programs should 
best divide the new funding. Any unused funds can be carried over from year to year with 
no expiration date, keeping in-line with current MCC funding structure. A mechanism for 
redistributing MCC funds to different US agencies or aid plans under discretion of the 
DFA and MCC CEO might be created. 
 
The Threshold Gold Program is modeled after the current Threshold Program, with some 
amendments. Threshold Gold programs should implement contracts primarily with state 
and/or regional governments in countries that reflect solid progress in indicators/selection 
criteria. USG agency assistance should be limited in these countries, and used only in 
areas where recipient governments prove they cannot implement projects on their own.  
 
Threshold Gold has the same approval structure as Compacts, unless a strong case is 
otherwise made for adopting the Threshold Program structure. For feasibility, a separate 
Board of Directors—which will most likely include many if not all of the same agency 
directors currently on the MCC Board—for Compacts and the Threshold/Threshold Gold 
programs may need to be established. 
 
In Model D, clearer description of exactly what indicator scores and criteria are needed to 
qualify for Threshold program(s), even if it is a range, is written into MCC regulations. 
This may require adding different indicators, and/or removing indicators currently on the 
MCC Compact list. Standard performance on these indicators is required to qualify for 
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Threshold and Threshold Gold programs. These reforms should limit politicization of the 
Threshold program. The Threshold program is currently one of the best systems to award 
‘improving’ countries, and these reforms further support Model D’s option of allotting it 
more funding. Countries that do not pass indicators should be referred to other aid 
programs at USAID or other agencies.  
 
Model D also adds a specific set of indicators/criteria specifically for the Threshold Gold 
program. These criteria should better fit state and regional governance and economic 
management, as failure on certain current indicators, e.g. macro indicators, may 
unnecessarily cause the MCC to overlook benevolent state and regional governments 
within a country that has a corrupt and/or ineffective national government.  
 
Model D proposes several other changes to current MCC/MCA system. It allows some 
Compacts to extend anywhere from six-ten years, which will create a better boundary of 
timeliness for some projects. It also allows multiple Compact agreements with individual 
countries, although there should be some restrictions on this practice. Also, the model 
provides a ‘Development Assistance Assurance Clause,’ preferably written into law, 
providing assurance to eligible countries that their DA funds will not be completely 
sacrificed because they are enrolled in a MCC/MCA program. To strengthen Compact 
accountability, Model D requires the MCC develop a clear criteria for penalizing, 
terminating, and/or reinstalling countries.  
 
Model D also adds two new indicators to the current MCC/MCA system. First, it adds an 
indicator for “inequality.” Such an indicator could use the Gini coefficient, Theil 
coefficient, a hybrid of the two, or another appropriate inequality gauge. There is 
substantial evidence to suggest that high levels of inequality complicate and slow poverty 
reduction. Second, a “disaster preparedness” indicator is added to the current system. 
This indicator might measure the amount of money used for, and quality of, a country’s 
Emergency/Early Warning System(s) (EWS) for disasters. Countries in disaster prone 
regions, e.g. the Sahel region in Africa, might be more critically evaluated on this 
indicator, as lack of disaster preparedness can cause years of aid to essentially go to waste 
in a matter of days. The MCC should work with the US Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (OFDA) on the logistics of this disaster preparedness indicator. 
 
The MCC may want to consider a few issues before building the Model D framework. It 
should review former-DFA Tobias’ FY 08 proposal for five categories of aid with the 
current DFA. It may want to commission a study on the institutional quality question of 
Model B and Appendix - Figure A. Also, the MCC may want to commission a study on 
the ‘in the pipeline’ issue of LMICs currently receiving MCA funding discussed in 
Model B and Appendix – Figure C. 
 
By improving Model C, Model D addresses the most pressing effectiveness issues 
discussed in models A, B, and C. Still, the model requires strong Executive leadership to 
make it feasible. Its new approach to the Threshold system should help address the 
problems with accountability mentioned in Model C. Model D also addresses country 
ownership weakness specifically mentioned in Model B and C, since Threshold Gold 
works fundamentally on a state and regional level where ‘true’ democratic participation is 
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likely easier to facilitate. If DFA-administered funds used to supplement the MCC do not 
significantly cut into PEPFAR and other particularly politically attractive programs in the 
Foreign Operations Budget, concerns over political control will be limited. Also, the 
‘Development Assistance Assurance Clause’ and new regulations for the Compact and 
Threshold programs address important shortcomings in the models. 
 
Although Model D has established a strong and applicable framework for effective aid, 
its results unfortunately can only be determined by the future. Although some suggest a 
sunset date for the MCA/MCC, which can be reworked if the program yields results in 
line with its mission, this is probably unnecessary in part because it was not already 
written in the MCC’s founding legislation. Further, given Model D has more promise for 
meeting MCC mission/goals than the current MCC, it does not need a sunset provision. 
Still, if a sunset provision is required it should be at least a decade, or another reasonable 
amount of time taking into account the inherent lag in results of aid programs. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Neither Model A, B, or C are extremely effective models of aid distribution, thus we have 
little reason to believe they will be more effective in the future. Channeling more aid 
through an amended model, Model D, however, will substantially improve the overall 
effectiveness of aid. Model D is also applicable to the future because it is politically and 
fiscally feasible, and demands a reasonable restructure of foreign assistance possible with 
the proper Executive leadership.  
 
Aid can still continue to have a “strategic” and “ideological” focus in Model D. Model D 
aid is not awarded to countries that necessarily “deserve” it, but rather funds a current 
core strategic and ideological objective of US aid: effectiveness. The fact that Model D 
might award aid to “deserving” countries is only a bi-product of the model. As long as 
effectiveness remains an objective of the US, Model D is a viable model of foreign aid 
reform.  
 
Our nation’s strategic and ideological goals, of course, will be determined by the future. 
If our goals are encouraging effective aid as a potential means for alleviating poverty, 
Model D will work well. If our goals are building strategic partnerships—making strong 
alliances with countries stable and capable enough to meaningfully represent US interests 
of economic cooperation, combating terrorism, preventing the proliferation of WMDs, 
and curtailing international drug traffic—Model D will also work well. The degree of 
political and administrative commitment to the core objective of effectiveness, however, 
determines exactly how much aid will be distributed through the model and whether it 
might be used to replace aid systems currently outside DFA and MCC administration. 
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APPENDIX – FIGURE A 
 
Institutional Ranking and MCC Country Selection 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions: 
 
These findings do not mesh with the assumption that MCC countries, since they score well on MCC 
indicators, have comparatively better institutions than those with worse indicator scores. There are several 
possible reasons for this seeming contradiction, some of which have to do with the methodology of the 
regression: 
 
1) Countries in similar income brackets may have institutions that are not all that different. 
2) Institutional quality might not matter as much for MCC selection as suspected. This may challenge:
 a) the theory that institutional strength is key for development  
b) the notion that MCC indicators accurately gauge a country’s potential for economic growth and 
development 
c) the idea that the GCI ranking system is an appropriate measure of development or economic 
growth potential 
3) This study may be flawed because it only uses 44 observations (only LIC countries)--the only countries 
that are both MCC and GCI ranked (the 2006 MCC excel scorecard ranks 83 countries, 71 which are not 
subject to US aid restrictions, and all of which are all LICs). Accordingly: 
 a) the limit of 44 countries could restrict the findings 
b) the 44 country limit could suggest that MCC-considered countries not ranked by the GCI were 
either too small or too institutionally weak to be even considered for such a ranking (which in turn 
would boost the probability that this study’s P-value is too high) 
4) The results may be skewed because countries passing MCC indicator restrictions—scoring over the 
median on half of the indicators per the three categories and passing the corruption indicator—may also 
score particularly poorly in at least one MCC indicator, or in an area measured by the GCI but unmeasured 
by the MCC, which would ultimately drag down those countries overall GCI institutional ranking. 
5) The results may also be skewed because LMICs were not included in the regression.  
 
 
Multiple R 0.0980 
R squared 0.0096 
Adjusted R squared -0.0387 
Std. error 19.5922 
 Coefficient Std. 
error 
t-stat P-
value 
intercept 101.7895 4.494 22.6461 8.54E-
25 
Compact 
dummy 
-2.0971 7.0519 -0.2973 .7676 
Threshold 
dummy 
-4.5394 7.2243 -0.6283 .5332 
Compact & Threshold Dummy 
Regression Analysis Key 
 
Y variable: 2006 Institutional Ranking, 
World Economic Forum GCI  
 
2 X variables: dummy Compact country, 
dummy Threshold country 
 
Observations: 44  
 
X variables were not stat. sig. individually 
or measured together (see table to the left).  
 
A second regression was run with and 
without countries prohibited from receiving 
direct USG aid, but the P-value(s) did not 
significantly change in the stat. sig. 
direction. A second Y variable of 
Institutional GCI score, instead of ranking, 
was also tested for both regressions, but the 
P-value(s) for these regressions did not 
significantly change in a stat. sig. direction.  
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APPENDIX – FIGURE B 
 
Potential Political Factors Determining Distribution of Threshold Program Monies 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional Score 
 
Multiple R  0.6123 
R squared 0.3749 
Adjusted R squared 0.3181 
Standard error 11.2922 
 
 Coefficient Standard 
error 
t-stat P-
value 
intercept 45.5092 27.1768 1.6745 0.1221 
Inst. 
score 
19.4083 7.5553 2.5688 0.0261 
 
Terrorist Safe Haven 
 
Multiple R 0.5438 
R squared 0.2957 
Adjusted R Square 0.2317 
Std. Error 11.986 
 
 Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-stat P-
value 
intercept 19.925 3.79 5.2565 .00026 
Terrorist 
safe 
haven 
16.9588 7.890 2.149 .05472 
 
Multiple R 0.6977 
R squared 0.4868 
Adjusted R squared 0.3842 
Std. error 10.7308 
 Coefficient Std. 
error 
t-stat P-value 
intercept 32.3825 27.3121 1.1856 0.2631 
Terrorist 
safe 
haven 
11.2964 7.6487 1.4768 0.1704 
Inst. 
score 
15.0050 7.7741 1.9301 0.0824 
Institutional Score & Terrorist Haven 
Regression Analysis Key 
 
Y variable: $/millions Threshold Program 
contracts for all 13 countries 
 
13 X variables: year Threshold $ awarded, 
population, $ GNI/capita, % Muslim, % 
below poverty line, # visits by Secretary of 
State (2001-2007), % GDP military 
spending, % adult AIDS rate, % exports to 
US, % imports from US, terrorist safe 
haven, institutional score, $ US ODA 2005, 
change in US ODA from 2000-2005.  
 
All variables, except those included, proved 
less than 94% stat. sig. (on their own and 
when tested with other variables) 
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APPENDIX – FIGURE C 
 
Percentage of LMICs in Compact Program 
 
Percentage of LMICs in Threshold Program 
 
Percentage of LMICs in Threshold or Compact Program(s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Currently funded Compact Eligible for Compact 
Out of currently funded 
Compacts 
36% 45% 
Out of all eligible Compact 
countries 
15% 19% 
 Currently funded Threshold plan Eligible for Threshold plan 
Out of currently funded Threshold 
plans 
23% 7% 
Out of all eligible Threshold 
countries 
14% 4% 
 Either Threshold or Compact country 
Out of currently funded Threshold plans or 
Compacts 
29% 
Out of all eligible Threshold or Compact countries 15% 
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APPENDIX – FIGURE D 
Countries receiving the most US Military Aid (excludes Iraq and Afghanistan) 
Countries Military 
 
Aid 
Income 
 
GNI/capi
ta         
Pass 
MCC 
Income 
Require
ment? 
Would be MCC Indicator Scores 
(# passing green scores/# total possible 
scores) 
 
MCC 
country 
already? 
Qualify  
under MCC 
indicator 
and income 
criteria 
(score 
above the 
mean on at 
least half 
per/section) 
Ruling 
Justly 
 
 
  Economic  
  Freedom 
 
 
Investing 
in people 
 
 
1.  Israel $2280 
mil. 
$18,620 F ?  ? ?          N      N 
2. Egypt $1,306 
mill. 
$1,250 P 3/6  
P 
4/4 
P 
4/6 
P 
N Y 
3. Colombia $558 
mill. 
$2,290 P 2/6 
F 
2/4 
F 
3/6 
F 
N N 
4. Jordan $461 
mill. 
$2,500 P 3/6 
P 
3/4 
P 
3/6 
P 
Y 
Threshold
& rec. for 
Compact 
eligibility 
Y 
5. Pakistan $698 
mill. 
$690 P 2/6 
F 
0/4 
F 
5/6 
P 
N N 
Indicator scores and GNI taken from MCC 2007 Country Scorebook 
 
P=Pass; F= Fail; N=No; Y=Yes 
 
 
There are several revealing findings in this analysis. Although Jordan passed the MCC indicator test in 
2006 (3/6 on “Ruling Justly,” 4/4 on “Investing in People,” 3/6 on “Economic Freedom”), it was only 
recommended for Threshold assistance in 2006. As of 2007, Jordan was recommended as eligible for MCC 
Compact assistance. Interestingly, Egypt has passed the MCC indicator test since 2005, however, has never 
been listed as eligible for Threshold or Compact assistance.  
 
Given these findings, one might speculate. Perhaps Jordan’s recommendation as a Compact country over 
other qualifying countries like Egypt was more a political/strategic decision than a merit based award—
especially since Jordan’s score on “Investing in People” actually fell from green on 4/4 indicators in 2006 
to green on 3/4 in 2007. This suspicion is reasonable given Jordan was pulled into the Threshold Program 
chiefly by Secretary Rice in the first place--likely because of its proximity to Iraq and reliability as an ally 
in the Middle East. One might also speculate Jordan was invited to the Threshold rather than the Compact 
Program in 2006 because Threshold plans give the USG more influence into country plans than do 
Compacts.  This is supported given Threshold Programs have traditionally—and seemingly wisely—been 
used for countries with corruption problems, however, Jordan received a green score for “Control of 
Corruption” in 2006, scoring in the 97% range. There seems to be a special reason why Jordan was made a 
Threshold Program country in 2006.  
 
Lastly, given Jordan’s inclusion in the eligibility pool, one might speculate that Egypt’s exclusion from the 
pool was an attempt to avert criticism that the MCA/MCC is just another strategic US aid program for the 
Middle East.   
 
